North Korea and U.S. in 1997
More from Blowback by Chalmers Johnson. His articles are also online, website of the Japan Policy Research Institute:
American Intelligence Services Lose Credibility Over East Asian Security Problems
Even though it remains a small, failed Communist regime whose people are starving and have no petroleum, North Korea is a useful whipping boy for any number of interests in Washington. If the military needs a post-Cold War opponent to justify its existence, North Korea is less risky than China. Politicians seek partisan advantage by claiming that others are "soft" on defending the country from "rogue regimes." And the arms lobby had a direct interest in selling its products to each and every nation in East Asia, regardless of its political orientation.
There is considerable evidence that since the signing of the Agreed Framework in 1994, a series of mysterious incidents has been created deliberately to undermine diplomatic efforts to reduce tensions. In September 1997, for instance, the United States, South Korea, China, and North Korea were scheduled to hold negotiations on replacing the forty-five-year-old Korean armistice with a peace treaty. In the same month the United States also said it hoped to obtain North Korea's adherence to an inernational agreement first negotiated in 1987 called the Missile Technology Control Regime. This agreement sought to bring under control the transfer of technologies that could be used to make intercontinental ballistic missiles. The United States had indicated in advance that it would lift some of its economic sanctions against North Korea if it would halt deployment and sales of its missiles.
On August 22, 1997, the eve of the talks, the North Korean ambassador to Egypt, a key player in North Korea's missile sales to the Middle East, "defected" to the United States. R. Jeffrey Smith, a reporter for the Washington Post, quoted a CIA source as saying, "There will be people in the intelligence community who will be salivating to see this guy." (Washington Post, August 27, 1997) In the New York Times Steven Lee Myers noted that the defection threatened the peace talks but quoted another U.S. official as saying, "The alternative of turning down a bona fide plea for asylum from a state like North Korea is pretty unthinkable." (New York Times, August 28, 1997) Jamie Rubin, a State Department spokesman, insisted that the defection "will not affect the four-party peace talks." ("Special State Department Briefing," U.S. Information Agency Transcript, August 26, 1997) Then Newsweek revealed that the former ambassador had in fact long been on the CIA's payroll. (Newsweek, September 8, 1997) Informed observers concluded that he had not so much defected as been called in from the cold at a time of the CIA's choosing and with an eye toward scuttling the upcoming talks. North Korea in retaliation declined to attend either set of scheduled meetings.
American Intelligence Services Lose Credibility Over East Asian Security Problems
Even though it remains a small, failed Communist regime whose people are starving and have no petroleum, North Korea is a useful whipping boy for any number of interests in Washington. If the military needs a post-Cold War opponent to justify its existence, North Korea is less risky than China. Politicians seek partisan advantage by claiming that others are "soft" on defending the country from "rogue regimes." And the arms lobby had a direct interest in selling its products to each and every nation in East Asia, regardless of its political orientation.
There is considerable evidence that since the signing of the Agreed Framework in 1994, a series of mysterious incidents has been created deliberately to undermine diplomatic efforts to reduce tensions. In September 1997, for instance, the United States, South Korea, China, and North Korea were scheduled to hold negotiations on replacing the forty-five-year-old Korean armistice with a peace treaty. In the same month the United States also said it hoped to obtain North Korea's adherence to an inernational agreement first negotiated in 1987 called the Missile Technology Control Regime. This agreement sought to bring under control the transfer of technologies that could be used to make intercontinental ballistic missiles. The United States had indicated in advance that it would lift some of its economic sanctions against North Korea if it would halt deployment and sales of its missiles.
On August 22, 1997, the eve of the talks, the North Korean ambassador to Egypt, a key player in North Korea's missile sales to the Middle East, "defected" to the United States. R. Jeffrey Smith, a reporter for the Washington Post, quoted a CIA source as saying, "There will be people in the intelligence community who will be salivating to see this guy." (Washington Post, August 27, 1997) In the New York Times Steven Lee Myers noted that the defection threatened the peace talks but quoted another U.S. official as saying, "The alternative of turning down a bona fide plea for asylum from a state like North Korea is pretty unthinkable." (New York Times, August 28, 1997) Jamie Rubin, a State Department spokesman, insisted that the defection "will not affect the four-party peace talks." ("Special State Department Briefing," U.S. Information Agency Transcript, August 26, 1997) Then Newsweek revealed that the former ambassador had in fact long been on the CIA's payroll. (Newsweek, September 8, 1997) Informed observers concluded that he had not so much defected as been called in from the cold at a time of the CIA's choosing and with an eye toward scuttling the upcoming talks. North Korea in retaliation declined to attend either set of scheduled meetings.
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