The Problem Is Loyalty
Cut and Run? You Bet.
Lt. Gen. William E. Odom, professor at Yale and director of the National Security Agency from 1985 to 1988, argues that a civil war in Iraq began weeks after U.S. forces toppled Saddam; that we are doomed to pay the price of encouraging the terrorists, whether we leave or stay, because our invasion made Iraq safe for them; that withdrawal would improve U.S. credibility around the world; that invading Iraq was not in the interests of the United States - but it was in the interests of Iran and al Qaeda. And much more.
"Before U.S. forces stand down, Iraqi security forces must stand up.
The problem in Iraq is not military competence. The problem is loyalty. To whom can Iraqi officers and troops afford to give their loyalty? The political camps in Iraq are still shifting. So every Iraqi soldier and officer risks choosing the wrong side. As a result, most choose to retain as much latitude as possible to switch allegiances. All the U.S. military trainers in the world cannot remove that reality. But political consolidation will. Political power can only be established via Iraqi guns and civil war, not through elections or U.S. colonialism by ventriloquism."
Lt. Gen. William E. Odom, professor at Yale and director of the National Security Agency from 1985 to 1988, argues that a civil war in Iraq began weeks after U.S. forces toppled Saddam; that we are doomed to pay the price of encouraging the terrorists, whether we leave or stay, because our invasion made Iraq safe for them; that withdrawal would improve U.S. credibility around the world; that invading Iraq was not in the interests of the United States - but it was in the interests of Iran and al Qaeda. And much more.
"Before U.S. forces stand down, Iraqi security forces must stand up.
The problem in Iraq is not military competence. The problem is loyalty. To whom can Iraqi officers and troops afford to give their loyalty? The political camps in Iraq are still shifting. So every Iraqi soldier and officer risks choosing the wrong side. As a result, most choose to retain as much latitude as possible to switch allegiances. All the U.S. military trainers in the world cannot remove that reality. But political consolidation will. Political power can only be established via Iraqi guns and civil war, not through elections or U.S. colonialism by ventriloquism."
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